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  Many decisions concerning long-lived investments need to take into account 
climate change. But doing so is not easy for at least two reasons. First, due to the rate of 
climate change, new infrastructure will have to be able to cope with a large range of 
changing climate conditions, which will make design more difficult and construction 
more expensive. Second, uncertainty in future climate makes it impossible to directly use 
climate model outputs as inputs for infrastructure design, and there are good reasons to 
think that the needed climate information will not be available soon. Instead of 
optimizing based on the climate conditions projected by models, therefore, future 
infrastructure should be made robust to most possible changes in climate conditions. This 
aim implies that users of climate information must also change their practices and 
decision-making frameworks, for instance by adapting the uncertainty-management 
methods they currently apply to exchange rates or R&D outcomes. Five methods are 
examined: (i) introducing long-term prospective exercises; (ii) selecting “no-regret” 
strategies; (iii) favouring reversible options; (iv) reducing decision time horizons; and (v) 
promoting soft adaptation strategies. I argue that adaptation strategies should not be 
assessed in an isolated context. In particular, it is essential to consider both negative and 




















1.  Introduction 
 
  Only a few years ago, most people thought that adapting our economies to changing 
climate conditions would not be necessary for decades. But there is now increasing agreement 
that many decisions already need to take into account climate change. Obviously, many 
decisions have only short term consequences or are only weakly climate sensitive. A factory 
that produces electronic devices has a lifetime of less than a few decades, and climate 
conditions will not be that different over this timescale. Also, such a factory is not highly 
sensitive to climate conditions, provided that it is not built in a flood plain or along a 
coastline. But many decisions come with a long term commitment and can be very climate 
sensitive. Examples of such decisions include urbanisation plans, risk management strategies, 
infrastructure development for water management or transportation, and building design and 
norms. These decisions have consequences over periods of 50 to 200 years. Urbanisation 
plans influence city structures over even longer timescales. These kinds of decisions and 
investments are also vulnerable to changes in climate conditions and sea level rise. For 
example, many building that are supposed to last up to one hundred years will have to cope in 
2100 with climate conditions that, according to most climate models, will be radically 
different from current ones. So, when designing a building, architects and engineers have to 
be aware of and account for the future changes that can be expected. Also, Nicholls et al. 
(2007) showed that, in 2070, up to 140 million people and US$35,000 billion of assets could 
be dependent on flood protection in large port cities around the world because of the 
combined effect of population growth, urbanization, economic growth, and sea level rise. But 
previous coastal defence projects (e.g., the Thames Barrier) have shown that implementing 
coastal protection infrastructure typically has a lead-time of 30 years or more. Also, 
urbanisation plans can influence flooding risk only over many decades. This inertia suggests 
that action must begin today to protect port cities and to manage flood risk for impacts 
expected by the middle of this century. To be efficient, however, this action has to take into 
account sea level rise and possible changes in storminess linked to climate change.  
  Fortunately, there has been a significant rise in awareness worldwide about climate 
change. The positive outcome of this shift in awareness is that many architects, urban 
planners, water managers, and other planners are now concerned about how climate change 2 
will influence their activities. Climate change laboratories are well aware of this shift, as 
demands for information about future climates are becoming more frequent.  
  Even though this new awareness is very positive, it is hardly enough. Climate change 
represents more than a just change in climate conditions. For decision-makers, climate change 
represents, more importantly, a dramatic increase in uncertainty. In the past, the climate 
parameters pertinent to most activities could be observed and measured. Statistical analyses 
and optimization algorithms were able to produce “best” designs
1 as a function of known 
climate conditions. In the future, however, substantial climate uncertainty makes such 
methods more difficult to apply. It seems, therefore, that new decision-making methods have 
to be developed. This article discusses the issues we face in the development of these much 
needed methods.  
 
2.  Long-Term Investments and Climate Uncertainty 
 
  When designing climate-sensitive investments, like water management infrastructures, 
engineers are used to turning to national meteorological services that are often responsible for 
collecting weather data and creating climate data, i.e. statistical analyses of weather 
conditions. These climate data include simple information, like average annual temperature 
and precipitation, and very sophisticated ones, like statistics of meteorological extremes (e.g. 
heavy-precipitation probabilities). These climate data are then used, among many other 
parameters, by engineers to design infrastructure and buildings, by insurance companies to 
calculate premiums and capital needs, by farmers to choose crops and equipment, by national 
governments to assess energy security requirements, by local authorities to assess building 
permits, etc.  
  Now that it is widely believed that climate change will modify these climate data, 
these users turn to climate modellers to produce the equivalent of these observed climate data, 
but for the future climate. This approach, however, will not work. 
  The first problem arises from the speed of the expected changes. In Hallegatte et al. 
(2007), the authors proposed a measure of climate change using “climate analogues”. They 
showed, for instance, that the future climate of Paris in 2080 under the SRES A2 scenario 
could become the current climate of Cordoba (South of Spain). This would mean that a 
building built now to last 80 years would have to face, over its lifetime, the climate of Paris, 
                                                 
1 Given well-defined objectives. 3 
then a warming climate, up to the current climate of Cordoba. For an architect, it is not more 
difficult (nor more expensive) to design a building adapted to the climate of Cordoba than to 
the climate of Paris. It is, however, more difficult (and more expensive) to design a building 
adapted to both, i.e. able to be comfortable around the year, cheap to heat in winter, and cheap 
to air-condition in summer, in this large range of climate conditions (see for instance Roe et 
al, 2005).  
  So, an immediate impact of climate change could (and should) be the additional cost 
of designing new infrastructure to be adapted to the full range of possible future climates 
instead of only the current one. Paying this price now, indeed, may be the only way of 
avoiding large building and infrastructure retrofitting costs in a few decades.  
  But this issue is only a tiny part of the problem. More problematic is the uncertainty in 
future climate. Ideally, indeed, climate models would be able to produce climate statistics for 
the future, from today to when a building or when infrastructure will need to be replaced. This 
is the information that engineers need to optimize future investments. Unfortunately, climate 
change uncertainty is significant, and it is impossible to provide the equivalent of historical 
climate data for future climates. Even more unfortunately, climate model outputs resemble 
actual climate data so much that the temptation to use them carelessly is large. 
  To illustrate this problem, consider the case of a water manager in Toulouse, in the 
Southwest of France. To know how to change his or her activities, he or she can ask climate 
modellers to provide model outputs for precipitation over this region up to 2100 and apply 
unchanged methodology with climate model outputs instead of climate data as inputs. Such a 
method could be dangerously misleading, however. Projections of future precipitation 
changes, for Europe have been summarized by the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
(2007). From a climate scientist point of view, these results are very satisfying, as the patterns 
of change are very similar for all models, with an increase in precipitation in Northern Europe 
and a strong drying in the Mediterranean basin. But a water manager is much less satisfied as 
he/she realizes that, according to these models, precipitations in Toulouse could remain 
unchanged (according to the GISS model) or decrease by up to 30 percent (according to the 
CNRM model). How should she/he react to the possibility of the latter change, which would 
clearly require large modifications in water management strategies and infrastructures, and to 
this uncertainty? The traditional decision-making tools have not been developed to face such a 
situation and must, therefore, be amended. 
  A first conclusion is that, in this situation, climate modellers have to very careful when 
they are asked to provide model outputs. Not everybody is familiar with climate change 4 
modelling, and one could easily take model outputs as a reliable input for infrastructure 
design. To avoid such misunderstanding, a simple solution is to distribute climate model 
outputs to end-users only from a shared platform, where all climate model projections are 
available in a common format. Such a platform would be an equivalent of the IPCC Data 
Distribution Centre, but for high-resolution results. The creation of such a distribution 
infrastructure would limit the risk of misuse of climate model results.  
 
3.  New Strategies to Adapt to New Climates 
  
  When a user is confronted with the multiplicity of model outputs, a natural reaction is 
to ask climate scientists to improve knowledge and understanding, to provide, as soon as 
possible, reliable forecasts of future conditions. Of course, one can expect that climate science 
will progress in the future and that the range of climate projections will narrow, making their 
use easier. 
  There is increasing evidence, however, that improved knowledge does not mean 
narrower projection ranges. First, even if models were perfectly accurate, uncertainty would 
not disappear.  First, future levels of greenhouse gas emissions, which by nature cannot be 
forecasted, largely determine future climate change. But there are also large differences 
between the projections of different climate models that do not seem to be diminishing with 
time. The example of climate sensitivity, i.e. the increase in equilibrium global mean 
temperature when CO2 concentration is doubled, is striking: the range of published estimates 
has remained essentially unchanged over three decades in spite of the improvement of climate 
models and our much better understanding of climate processes (see Roe and Baker, 2007). 
As another example, new evidence that land-based glaciers (such as those in Greenland) may 
respond more quickly to warming and in less gradual and predictable ways has recently 
reduced the certainty of the IPCC’s latest sea-level-rise projections. So, climate models may 
well be unable to provide the information current decision-making frameworks need until it is 
too late to avoid large-scale retrofitting of infrastructure. Also, climate models are based on a 
set of common assumptions, and therefore underestimate the full range of uncertainty.  
  If climate models disagree, will climate observations tell us which one is right? 
Unfortunately, even though they will eventually, they will do it quite late in the century. For 
instance, changes in precipitation patterns in the Mediterranean basin may remain 
undetectable by statistical methods until 2050 (IPCC, 2007).  If we wait for climate change to 
be detectable and models to be fully validated, many investments designed before that time 5 
will be ill-adapted by the end of the century, with potentially large economic costs. Moreover, 
observations can be dangerously misleading: worst-case scenarios can arise from the 
difficulty in attributing observed changes to global climate change. For instance, multi-
decadal variability can modify precipitation patterns over long periods. If these transitory 
modifications are understood by economic actors as anthropogenic climate change patterns, 
i.e. as permanent modifications, ill-designed adaptation strategies could be implemented and  
make the situation even worse than without adaptation.  
  Hurricanes are a good example of this situation, where observations cannot provide 
the required information: does the current high-activity level in the North Atlantic arise from 
climate change, as proposed by Emanuel (2005) and Webster (2005), or does it arise from 
multi-decadal variability as proposed by Landsea (2005)? In the first case, hurricane activity 
is likely to keep increasing in the future and ambitious adaptation strategies must be 
implemented without delay to reduce vulnerability. But uncertainty concerning the driver of 
the current level of activity makes it difficult to make appropriate decisions regarding 
protection infrastructure and land-use restrictions (Hallegatte, 2006). Here, observations will 
not be able to provide the needed information for many decades, and waiting for this signal 
would be a critical error. 
  Since climate models and observations cannot provide what current decision-making 
frameworks need, the only solution is to amend these frameworks to make them able to take 
this uncertainty into account. To do so, infrastructure should be designed acknowledging (i) 
that it will need to cope with a larger range of climate conditions than before; and (ii) that this 
range is and will remain highly uncertain. In such a context, optimizing infrastructure design 
for a given climate may not be the best strategy. If it were possible to attribute probabilities to 
possible future changes, probabilistic optimization strategies could easily be introduced. But 
these probabilities are not available; even though some have been produced at the regional 
scale (e.g., Giorgi and Mearns, 2003), they are still heatedly debated.  
  A better approach is to develop new strategies, especially those created to cope with 
the inherent uncertainties of climate change (e.g., Lempert and Schlesinger 2000). For 
instance, it is possible to base decisions on scenario analysis (e.g., Schwartz, 1996) and to 
choose the most robust solution, i.e. the one that is the most insensitive to future climate 
conditions, instead of looking for the “best” choice under one scenario (Lempert et al., 2006; 
Lempert and Collins, 2007). For professionals, these methods are consistent with those 
commonly used to manage exchange-rate risks, energy cost uncertainty, research and 
development outcomes, and many other situations that cannot be forecast with certainty. Such 6 
robust decision-making methods have already been applied in many long-term planning 
contexts, including water management in California (Groves and Lempert 2007, Groves et al. 
2007). For most decision-makers, the novelty will be the application of these methods to 
climate conditions. This requires users of climate information to collaborate more closely with 
climate scientists and to adapt their decision-making methods to the climate change context. 
 
4.  Practical Solutions to Increase Robustness 
 
  Within this new decision-making framework, five examples of practical strategies that 
favour robustness over performance can be proposed.  
  First, the “institutionalization” of a long-term planning horizon may help anticipate 
problems and implement adequate responses. For instance, in the framework of the California 
Water Plan, all water suppliers that provide water to more than 3,000 customers in California 
have to carry out, every 5 years, a 25-year prospective of their activity, including the 
anticipation of future water demand, future water supply sources, and “worst-case” drought 
scenarios. These kinds of exercise are very useful because they force planners to think several 
decades ahead, they create contacts between economic agents and climate scientists, and they 
help shape strategies to cope with future changes. In the present situation, where parameters 
that used to be known become uncertain, a long-term planning horizon is key to determining 
where and how to change business practices. 
  Second, “no-regret” strategies, i.e. strategies that reduce vulnerability at negative, null 
or negligible costs, are often available and should be implemented. Better insulation of 
buildings is a typical example of such strategies, since this action increases robustness while 
energy savings can often pay back the additional cost in only a few years. But there are many 
other examples. For instance, to calibrate drainage infrastructure, water managers in 
Copenhagen now use run-off figures that are 70 percent larger than their current level. Some 
of this increase is meant to deal with population growth and the rest is to cope with climate 
change, which may lead to an increase in heavy precipitation over Denmark. This 70 percent 
increase has not been precisely calibrated, because such a calibration is made impossible by 
climate change uncertainty. But this increase is thought to be large enough to cope with 
almost any possible climate change during this century. This move is justified by the fact that, 
in the design phase, it is inexpensive to implement a drainage system able to cope with 
increased precipitation. On the other hand, modifying the system after it has been built is 
difficult and expensive. It is wise, therefore, to be over-pessimistic in the design phase. Often, 7 
when it is cheap, it is sensible to add “security margins” to design criteria, in order to improve 
the resilience of infrastructure to future (expected or unexpected) changes.  
  Third, it is wise to favour strategies that are reversible over irreversible choices. The 
aim is to keep as low as possible the cost of being wrong about future climate change. An 
example of a situation in which this criterion can be important is urban planning. When 
deciding whether to allow the urbanisation of an area potentially at risk of flooding if climate 
change increases river runoff, the decision-maker must be aware of the fact that one answer is 
reversible while the other is not. Refusing to urbanise, indeed, has a well known short-term 
cost, but if new information shows in the future that the area is safe, urbanisation can be 
allowed virtually overnight. Allowing urbanisation now, on the other hand, yields short-term 
benefits, but if the area is found dangerous in the future, the choice will be between retreat 
and protection. Retreat is costly, but often the best solution from an economic point of view. It 
is, however, very difficult politically, especially if urbanisation has been explicitly allowed. 
Protection is even more expensive, and it is important to consider the residual risk: protection 
is efficient up to the protection design. If the protection is overtopped or fails, like in New 
Orleans, human and economic losses can be very large (Hallegatte, 2006; Nicholls et al., 
2007). So, allowing urbanisation is very difficult to reverse, and this strategy is highly 
vulnerable to the underestimation of future risks, which is the best argument for the 
alternative strategy. 
  Fourth, the uncertainty regarding future climate conditions increases rapidly with time. 
Reducing the lifetime of investments, therefore, is an easy way of reducing uncertainty and 
corresponding costs. This strategy has already been implemented in the forestry sector by 
choosing species that have a shorter rotation time. In other sectors, it is also often possible to 
avoid long-term commitment and choose shorter-lived decisions. For example, if houses will 
be built in an area that may become at risk of flooding if precipitation increases, it may be 
rational to build cheaper houses with a shorter lifetime instead of high-quality houses meant 
to last one hundred years. 
  Fifth, technical solutions are not the only way of adapting to different climates. 
Sometimes, institutional or financial tools can also be efficient. For instance, agriculture is 
very sensitive to water availability. If the variability of water availability is expected to 
increase, like in the Mediterranean basin where more droughts are found in climate model 
projections, adaptation in the agriculture sector can involve water management infrastructure, 
from water reservoirs to water transport or even desalinisation. These adaptation strategies, 
however, are highly dependent on future precipitation levels. Some of them, like water 8 
reservoirs, will be efficient if climate change remains moderate, but cannot cope with the 
most pessimistic projections. Facing a reduction in water availability, is it safe to invest 
substantially in adaptation projects that may become inefficient if the situation worsens? In 
these cases, other adaptation strategies can be explored, like insurance schemes (see, e.g., 
Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2003; Hellmuth et al., 2007). If variability increases, it means that 
farmers will have to cope with more bad years, but their mean productivity may remain 
unchanged. Therefore, an insurance scheme that protects them against heavy losses when 
weather is unfavorable may be as efficient as “hard” adaptation options involving costly 
infrastructure.  
  In the same way, in hurricane-prone regions, it may be more efficient to implement an 
efficient warning and evacuation system combined with a strong (possibly expensive) 
insurance scheme than to protect all populations with seawalls and dikes. In the former case, 
the population is evacuated in dangerous conditions (e.g., an approaching hurricane) to avoid 
deaths and casualties, and material losses are paid by insurance claims. The insurance 
premium the population will have to pay to live in this at-risk area may be large, but remain 
lower than the cost of protecting the areas with dikes. Of course, warning systems are not 
flawless and it is always difficult to decide whether and when to evacuate, but the Katrina 
experience demonstrated that hard protection can also fail, with the most tragic consequences.  
  The key advantage of “soft” adaptation options, like insurance, warning and 
evacuation, is that they imply much less inertia and irreversibility than hard adaptation: an 
insurance scheme can be adjusted every year, unlike a water reservoir. The risk of “sunk 
costs” if climate projections are wrong is much lower for institutional and financial strategies 
than for technical adaptation projects, which makes them more suitable to the current context 
of high uncertainty.  
  A sixth proposition may be to wait until more information on future climate conditions 
becomes available. Many have proposed, for instance, to postpone decisions about 
greenhouse gas emissions constraints until more information on climate sensitivity is 
produced. For mitigation decisions like for other long-term decisions, unfortunately, such a 
strategy is likely to lead to delayed decisions made too late. Moreover, for many infrastructure 
decisions, waiting is not an option, since all climate-sensitive decisions cannot simply be 
delayed by decades. This last strategy seems, therefore, to have limited applicability.  
  A last point deserves to be mentioned. Adaptation strategies often have side-effects 
that can be either negative or positive. The ancillary benefits in terms of energy consumption 
of better building insulation are a good example of synergy between adaptation and emission 9 
reduction. But there are also conflicts between adaptation options, like the consequences for 
water availability of increased use of snow-making to compensate for shorter skiing seasons 
in mountain areas, or between adaptation and mitigation, like energy consumption from 
desalinisation plants. These side-effects can be large enough to modify the diagnosis on some 
adaptation options, and adaptation therefore must not be investigated in an isolated context. 
  In particular, many adaptation strategies that are appealing today imply increased 
energy consumption (e.g., desalinisation, air conditioning, water transport). In the design of 
adaptation strategies, therefore, future energy costs have to be taken into account: if there is a 
high carbon price in 2030, desalinisation plants using fossil fuels may become excessively 
expensive to run. Considering the huge investment cost of these plants, this possibility has to 
be accounted for in the decision-making process. Moreover, there is an unfortunate 
correlation between energy costs and climate change impacts. If climate change appears to be 
worse than expected in fifty years, indeed, stricter mitigation strategies are likely to be 
introduced at the international level, making energy costs and carbon price rise. Highly 
energy-consuming adaptation options, therefore, seem to be particularly non-robust, i.e. 
particularly inadequate given the present situation. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  Climate change will influence the way everybody must think about weather. Over the 
next few decades, the main change global warming will bring us may not be the change in 
weather itself. It may be the uncertainty regarding future climate conditions, which was 
marginal during previous centuries and, therefore, was neglected in decision-making. Now, 
uncertainty in future climate change is so large that it makes many traditional approaches to 
designing infrastructure and other long-lived investments inadequate.  
  This paper makes the case that end-users should not expect climate scientists to solve 
this problem by providing certain and accurate climate forecasts in due time. Fundamental 
scientific uncertainty will prevent climate models from providing this information soon. 
Natural variability that makes it difficult to detect and attribute climate changes will also 
prevent observations from doing so.  
  End-users, therefore, have to change the way they make decisions, to introduce climate 
uncertainty in their everyday operations. In most cases, they know how to do so, since 
uncertainty is already at the heart of many economic decisions: energy prices, exchange rates, 
and future technological developments are volatile and uncertain, and cannot be forecasted 10 
with precision. In addition to this (already long) list, it is urgent to make sure that all the 
information climate scientists can produce is used. If uncertainty is taken into account in all 
long-term decisions, many infrastructure projects will be better adapted in the future, and 
climate change impacts will remain lower and more manageable (Hallegatte, 2007). Only 
such an anticipatory adaptation strategy can buy us the time we need to wait for (still-to-be-
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